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Examining	the	roles	of	Bangladesh,	Myanmar	and
Maldives	in	the	rivalry	for	Indian	Ocean	supremacy
As	India	and	China	continue	to	vie	for	supremacy	of	the	highly	geopolitically	prized	Indian	Ocean,
Shantanu	Roy-Chaudhury	focuses	on	the	roles	of	Bangladesh,	Myanmar	and	Maldives	and	their
strategic	importance	for	both	states.			
The	world	is	increasingly	understanding	the	strategic	aspect	of	maritime	power	in	the	present	day.	The
Indian	Ocean	is	a	growing	region	of	competition	and	rivalry,	with	the	two	main	contenders	–	India	and
China,	having	significant	stakes	in	the	region.	While	India	views	the	Indian	ocean	as	a	part	of	its	neighbourhood,
increasing	Chinese	presence	in	its	‘backyard’	has	caused	alarm	in	recent	times.	This	has	led	to	the	emergence	of	a
maritime	great	game	between	these	two	Asian	powers.	As	a	result,	both	countries	are	heavily	investing	to	increase
their	naval	capabilities	and	out-manoeuvre	each	other	strategically.	From	China’s	side,	the	government	adopted	a
“string	of	pearls”	strategy	to	encircle	India.	This	comprised	of	establishing	a	series	of	ports	in	countries	surrounding
India	as	Beijing	has	done	in	Gwadar	in	Pakistan	and	Hambantota	in	Sri	Lanka	along	with	projects	in	Myanmar	and
Bangladesh.
One	of	the	main	facets	of	the	direct	rivalry	between	India	and	China	is	the	striving	for	influence	in	the	island	and
littoral	states	of	the	Indian	ocean.	This	article	will	lay	out	the	Chinese	expansions	in	Sri	Lanka,	Bangladesh,
Myanmar,	and	the	Maldives	as	a	part	of	the	string	of	pearls	strategy.
Bangladesh
Similar	to	Gwadar	and	the	port	projects	in	Sri	Lanka,	China	has	also	invested	in	significant	developments	in	both
Bangladesh	and	Myanmar.	Bangladesh	historically	was	always	seen	under	India’s	sphere	of	influence	and	as	its
partner.	However,	with	China	showing	keen	interest	in	the	Bangladesh,	views	on	India	and	China	polarised	domestic
politics	in	Bangladesh.	Memories	of	China	siding	with	Pakistan	during	the	Bangladesh	war	of	liberation	are	to	some
extent	forgotten,	as	the	Bangladesh	Navy	accepted	two	Chinese	submarines	in	2017;	a	decision	that	made	India
uncomfortable.
China	has	now	become	the	largest	arms	dealer	and	trading	partner	of	Bangladesh	and	is	heavily	invested	in
developing	infrastructure,	mainly	bridges	and	highways.	The	ports	in	Bangladesh	are	also	lucrative	for	China	as	they
not	only	contribute	to	the	string	of	pearls	strategy	to	encircle	India,	but	they	are	also	seen	as	an	alternative	route	to
China’s	dependence	on	the	Straits	of	Malacca	which	the	Chinese	have	fear	of	through	the	‘Malacca	dilemma’.	China
has	therefore	been	instrumental	in	upgrading	the	Chittagong	Port	and	is	developing	a	750-acre	industrial	park	in	the
city	which	will	largely	be	used	by	Chinese	manufacturing	firms.	China	has	not	been	able	to	make	the	kind	of	headway
into	Bangladesh	as	it	has	into	Pakistan	and	Sri	Lanka	as	they	have	suffered	setbacks	which	included	plans	for	the
construction	of	a	deep-sea	port	at	Sonadia	being	shelved	due	to	external	pressures.	However,	they	are	playing	the
long	game	through	these	developmental	projects	and	by	placating	both	the	Awami	League	and	the	pro-army	BNP.
Myanmar
Another	important	strategic	aspect	of	the	BRI	and	string	of	pearls	is	Myanmar,	where	China	is	their	top	trading
partner	and	has	emerged	as	the	single	largest	source	of	FDI	into	the	country.	China	has	successfully	linked	its
Yunnan	Province	with	the	country	through	an	oil	pipeline	and	the	militaries	of	the	two	countries	have	drawn	closer.
China’s	CITIC	Group	Corporation	also	won	two	contracts	which	allow	building	of	a	deep	sea	port	on	the	Bay	of
Bengal	–	which	directly	relates	to	the	string	of	pearls	strategy.	The	Chinese	will	also	build	an	industrial	area	in
western	Myanmar’s	Rakhine	State.	From	2009	however,	Chinese	attempts	to	expand	into	Myanmar	have	not	been
smooth	as	opposition	to	Chinese	construction	projects	arose	under	the	civilian	government	of	Thein	Sein.	This	led	to
the	suspension	of	the	Chinese	backed	Myitsone	Dam	in	2011.	China	has	had	increasing	competition	from	both	India
and	Japan	in	Myanmar	and	like	their	inroads	in	Bangladesh,	their	successes	in	bringing	the	two	countries	under	their
Belt	and	Road	Initiative	and	fortifying	their	string	of	pearls	has	been	limited.
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The	Maldives	at	sunset.	Photo	credit:	Benjamin	Griffiths,	Flickr,	CC	BY-NC	2.0.
The	Maldives
Maldives	is	another	island	state	which	has	historically	been	under	the	Indian	sphere	of	influence	but	has	recently
seen	a	growing	Chinese	footprint	slowly	eroding	India’s	primacy.	China	has	invested	millions	of	dollars	into	an	airport
expansion,	housing	development,	and	numerous	other	projects	in	the	country.	The	Indian	government	was	also
taken	by	surprise	when	China	entered	a	free-trade	agreement	with	them	in	2017.	Additionally,	China	has	also	leased
an	uninhabited	island	(Feydhoo	Finolhu)	for	50	years	for	tourism.
The	China-Pakistan	axis	and	their	‘all	weather	friendship’	is	also	a	worrying	factor	for	India.	China	is	building	a	port	in
Gwadar	in	Pakistan,	which	directly	plays	in	to	encircling	India.	In	2017	China	also	inaugurated	its	first	overseas
military	base	in	Djibouti	which	lies	on	the	Bab	el-Mandeb	Strait,	an	important	global	shipping	lane	which	leads	to	the
Suez	Canal,	and	on	the	northwest	end	of	the	Indian	Ocean.	Myanmar	and	Bangladesh	also	have	ports	which	are
being	developed	by	China.	Although	the	Chinese	portray	these	development	projects	as	purely	for	trade	reasons,
there	are	strong	indications	that	they	want	to	convert	these	trade	outposts	to	military	outposts,	which	was	seen	with
the	emergence	of	a	Chinese	submarine	in	Sri	Lanka,	and	warships	docking	in	Maldives,	both	incidents	serving	as	an
alarming	security	concern	for	India.
Counterbalances
Historically,	smaller	South	Asian	states	have	been	apprehensive	of	India’s	hegemonic	tendencies	in	the	region.	With
the	renewed	focus	of	China	on	the	region,	many	of	them	are	looking	to	balance	India	by	drawing	closer	to	China.
Although	India	cannot	compete	financially	with	China	to	develop	projects	overseas,	the	competition	is	not	completely
one-sided	in	favour	of	China	in	spite	of	what	the	above	examples	may	indicate.	Being	the	regional	power,	India	still
has	a	large	role	in	the	Indian	Ocean.	Chinese	investments	in	various	countries	have	also	left	the	host	countries	in
serious	debt.	The	Chinese	have	used	this	to	their	advantage	to	increase	influence.	States	slowly	realise	the	dangers
of	falling	into	this	debt	trap	and	may	become	increasingly	wary	of	China	as	more	time	passes.	The	increasing
Chinese	presence	has	also	left	locals	feeling	their	country	is	being	sold.	The	Chinese	business	model,	although
prosperous	for	China,	may	backfire	and	hinder	Chinese	development	projects.	The	Indian	Ocean,	although	vast,
does	have	choke	points	and	China	currently	has	no	other	alternative	but	to	go	through	the	extremely	narrow	strait	of
Malacca	to	enter	the	Indian	Ocean.
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If	the	current	state	of	affairs	continues,	China	will	look	to	expand	its	influence	via	smaller,	but	strategically	highly
valuable	South	Asian	states,	with	India	scrambling	to	play	a	balancing	act.	To	do	so,	India	has	been	exploring
options	to	balance	China	in	the	region.	Analysts	in	India	believe	that	one	way	to	do	this	would	be	through	closer
alignment	with	the	United	States	and	Japan,	who	also	want	to	keep	a	check	on	China’s	rise.	Similarly,	strengthening
relations	through	regional	partnerships	and	regional	balancing	lead	to	the	Modi	governments	unveiling	the
‘neighbourhood	first’	policy	in	2014,	which	has	focused	on	reaching	out	to	the	neighbouring	countries	to	develop
partnerships	across	the	region.	The	South	Asian	region	is	currently	one	of	the	least	economically	integrated	regions
in	the	world,	and	if	India	takes	the	lead	to	change	that,	Bangladesh,	Myanmar,	and	the	Maldives	may	not	have	to
look	at	an	extra	regional	power	to	fill	in	the	gaps.	Apart	from	a	wider	view	of	balancing	China,	the	Indian	government
should	equally	approach	this	country	by	country,	focusing	on	areas	where	ties	can	be	strengthened.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	posting.
About	the	Author
Shantanu	Roy-Chaudhury	is	currently	pursuing	an	MPhil	in	Modern	South	Asian	Studies	at	St.
Antony’s	College,	University	of	Oxford.	He	can	be	reached	at	shantanu.roychaudhury@sant.ox.ac.uk
South Asia @ LSE: Examining the roles of Bangladesh, Myanmar and Maldives in the rivalry for Indian Ocean supremacy Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-08-27
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/08/27/examining-the-roles-of-bangladesh-myanmar-and-maldives-in-the-rivalry-for-indian-ocean-supremacy/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/
